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EXTENSIVE INCOME AND VALUE OF THE FIRM: WHO GETS WHAT? 
Shyam Sunder * 
I. INTRODUCTION 
We can think of firms and other organizations as alliances among people embedded in the larger 
matrices of society and natural environment.  Their value depends on the perspective we choose.  
We examine the value of the firm from alternative perspectives and compare it to the benchmark 
concept of shareholder value.  We also explore the accounting, managerial, and policy 
implications of these values.  Social accounting under the label of corporate social responsibility 
or CSR came into vogue over the last quarter of the twentieth century.  What are its links to these 
values? 
Simon (1952) compared the neoclassical economics and organizational views of the firm.  Under 
the organizational or contract-theoretic view, based on Rousseau’s social contract and developed 
by Barnard (1936), Simon (1947), and Cyert and March (1963), a firm is a set of contracts or 
alliances among agents.  Each agent contributes factors of production to the firm, and receives 
compensation or inducement in the form of cash or other resources in exchange.  Each agent 
chooses to participate in the firm if the value of inducements offered by the firm exceeds the 
opportunity cost of his resource contributions.  All agents are located symmetrically in this 
simple scheme, labeled O-theory (for organization theory) in Simon (1952).  
In the neoclassical economic theory, labeled F-theory in Simon, a firm is seen as an instrument 
of the entrepreneur or owner.  In models of perfect or imperfect competition, all agents, other 
than the owner, are considered passive in the sense that their behavior can be well represented by 
their respective functions.  The owner, being the only active decision maker, works with 
production, supply and demand functions to maximize the value of the firm he owns.   Value to 
the owner—the net present value of future benefits flows between the shareholder and the firm 
discounted at the owner’s opportunity cost of capital—is the value of the firm.   If the present 
value is zero, investment in the firm creates no value for the shareholder relative to the next best 
investment opportunity available to him. 
Financial accounting reports and some aspects of national income statistics are directed to, and 
are based on the value to the owner.  Many approximations and compromises are made in 
moving from the economic concept to concrete measurements to produce financial and non-
financial data, which we return to later. There have been lengthy debates about alternative 
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specifications of the objective(s) of the firm.  Still, shareholder value reigns supreme in theory, 
data, accounting practice, and normative discussions of corporations.  
In contrast, contract theory of the firm treats all participating agents symmetrically.  Agents 
contribute factors; the firm uses its production technology to convert them into products, and 
distributes them as inducements to the agents.  For example a simple manufacturing firm with 
owner, labor, and customer as three classes of agents, collects capital, labor and cash as factors; 
and distributes dividends, wages, and products as inducements to them.    
Standard assumption in micro-economic theory of the firm is that the firm maximizes its 
profit by choosing its technology, production, and marketing.  For a given output, factor costs 
(other than the cost of equity) are minimized.  If the entrepreneur/owner makes all the 
decisions cost minimization is, at least, a credible possibility.  As decision-making is 
delegated to a hired manager who has asymmetric access to information and goals of his own 
cost minimization does not survive, even as a theoretical possibility.  The cost to the 
entrepreneur is the compensation sought by the manager who makes the decisions.  As more 
levels of management are added to the corporate hierarchy, each with his own ego, goals, and 
asymmetric access to special information; cost minimization recedes to become a remote 
ideal.  In agency theory this ideal is labeled the first-best solution; and the theoretical 
impossibility of attaining it gives rise to a new, second-best, benchmark that allows each 
participant a slice of the surplus or rent (compensation in excess of opportunity cost) of his 
own, in equilibrium contract with the superior.   This excess is the income of the respective 
agent.  
Sunder (1997, pp. 65-66) draws attention to the income streams—inducements less 
contributions—each agent receives from the firm.   He attributes the special status of the 
shareholder income as the income of the firm (and the associated capitalized shareholder value as 
the value of the firm) to the lowest priority shareholders have as residual claimants to a firm’s 
resources.  The residual character imparts special information and contractual properties to the 
shareholder income.  It carries, for example, information about the continued viability of the 
contract set of the firm. 
The special importance of income to shareholders need not diminish the significance of income 
to the other agents.  Corporations influence the lives of most people not only because they may 
own shares, but also because they may be customers, employees, vendors, neighbors, or citizens.  
These influences take many forms—direct and indirect, immediate and long run, local and 
global, through priced market transactions and externalities.  Tracking these income (or loss) 
streams from corporations to various agents in society can affect both private as well as public 
decision-making.  The work of Matsumoto (2007) on accounting for distribution of wealth in 
Japanese corporations is a good example. An intensive effort has been made over the past quarter 
century to broaden corporate reporting to include some of these elements under the label of 
social accounting (see, for example, AAA 1972, 1974; Estes 1972, 1976; Seidler and Seidler 
1974 and Zadek and Tuppen 2000).  We briefly review this literature before returning to discuss 
the value of the firm. 






II. SOCIAL ACCOUNTING 
 
Social accounting by business and other organizations is an attempt to measure and report their 
efforts, achievements, and impact an “social” dimensions.  Socioeconomic accounting, social 
responsibility accounting and social audit are used synonymously.  Energy conservation, 
minority hiring, environmental preservation, and support of community organizations are 
examples of such dimensions.  Appendix A outlines a list of dimensions that may be covered, 
although rarely at once, in social accounting.   Internet links to many such accounts are easily 
available.  Social accounting reports can be descriptive, and may include financial or non-
financial data.  They may also include data and analysis of non-priced externalities; justification 
for social expenditures being in the long-run interests of the shareholders; development of 
acceptable and reliable ways of quantifying hard to measure costs and benefits; and for some 
public organizations, cost-benefit analyses of social interventions and policies. 
 
Interpretation of “social” in social accounting, as illustrated in Appendix A, is construed 
narrowly.   It leaves out production, sale, and distribution of goods and services, and 
employment.  The intent here is not that these activities have no social impact or relevance.   
Instead, social accounting tends to focus on non-priced or unrecorded consequences of 
organizational activities with the presumption that the priced activities are already included in 
regular financial reports.  A better interpretation of social accounting, one may argue, should be a 
comprehensive picture that includes priced as well as non-priced consequences. 
Implementations of social accounting place the responsibility for production of information 
on managers of the firm (see Elliott 1973).   Managers can report only what they know.  For 
many kinds of social consequences, managers have no such informational advantage.  
Information is inherently dispersed among agents in society; and it is difficult for one to know 
the preferences, knowledge, opportunity sets and certain actions of others.  Social accounts 
prepared by corporate managers, or any other single party, suffer from this inherent limitation 
of information accessible to that party.  When well-functioning markets exist, they bring the 
dispersed information together, incorporate it in price, and make it available to all (Hayek 
1945).  Since social accounting covers areas in which markets are weak or nonexistent, such 
solutions are not available in social accounting.  
 
A second problem of corporate social accounting is that most proposals have taken the 
perspective of the firm, instead of the members of society—the principals.  The traditional 
measure of value in business—value to the shareholder—and accounting directed to that end, 
have worked well because the concept and its implementation take the perspective of a principal.  
Attempts to broaden the shareholder perspective to a broader set of agents have been spent on 
descriptive details of corporate activity, giving social accounting a fuzzy image.  We may do 







III. VALUE OF THE FIRM 
 
All participants in a firm receive, or expect to receive, a stream of income—inducements less 
contributions—from the firm.  Accordingly, value of the firm to the owner is but one component 
of the value of the firm to all its participants. The concept of value that corresponds to the 
contract model is the difference between the inducements distributed from the firm to various 
agents, and the opportunity cost of resources contributed by them to the firm.  In other words, 
value of the firm is the sum of surplus the firm gives to all agents.  This note defines and 
explores the properties and implications of this extensive concept of firm’s value.  
 
A. VALUE TO INVESTORS 
 
Setting market imperfections aside, value of a firm to a prospective shareholder is the difference 
between the discounted present value of cash returns and the cash investments.  The discount rate 
is the opportunity cost of capital for the investor.  If the internal rate of return from the 
prospective investment is equal to the opportunity cost of capital, the value of the investment is 
zero; if IRR exceeds the opportunity cost of capital, this value is positive.   Presumably, investors 
would not make the investment when the IRR is lower.  Skillful investment consists of finding 
investment opportunities where IRR is greater than the opportunity cost of capital. 
 
After an investor buys the shares of a firm, the purchase price becomes sunk cost.  The value of 
this investment now is the present value of cash returns from the shares discounted at the 
opportunity cost of capital.  The value of the investment to prospective shareholder(s) is the cash 
return net of cash investments; value to an existing shareholder is just the gross cash return, 
appropriately discounted.  Stock prices are determined in the market place through interaction of 
demand and supply based on these individual shareholder values.  
 
Much of financial reporting is focused on the investor’s point of view—income to investors, and 
equity of investors.  We can apply the same point of view to other agents in the firm, and then 
return to aspects of accounting that address, or could address, those points of view.  
 
B. VALUE OF THE FIRM TO ITS CUSTOMERS 
 
Value of the firm to a customer can be evaluated in a manner parallel to the value to a 
prospective investor.  The customer “invests” in the firm in the form of search, learning, 
negotiation, payments including advance payments, and settlement of any disputes.  These 
investments are made in the expectation that the present value of benefits generated from the 
goods or services received from the firm, discounted at the opportunity cost of the customer’s 





capital, will exceed the opportunity of costs of resources invested.  Strictly speaking, this 
reckoning includes not only the transaction on hand, but also the consequences of this transaction 
for resource flows associated with the subsequent transactions.  A satisfactory transaction, for 
example, may cut the time to search, learn, and negotiate, frequency of disputes, and perhaps 
even the price associated with subsequent transactions.  These consequences, lumped together as 
customer goodwill, are reckoned in the “investment” decision associated with the transaction at 
hand.   
 
The customer transacts with the firm if the reckoning of resource flows shows the benefits of the 
transaction exceeds the opportunity cost of necessary sacrifices.  The present value of this excess 
is the value of the firm to the customer.  This value is also the customer’s share of the surplus 
generated by the firm.  If the customer pays the firm in advance, the value of the firm to the 
customer increases by the amount of the advance (analogous to the change in the value of the 
firm to prospective and existing shareholders). 
 
If multiple firms create conditions of perfect competition in the product market, a customer’s 
opportunity cost of buying from firm A is forgoing an identical product sold by its competitors at 
identical price.  Therefore, the consumer’s share of the surplus from buying from firm A instead 
of its competitors is zero.  An individual firm therefore creates zero value for the customers in a 
perfectly competitive market, and customer loyalty disappears.  To create value for customers, 
firms differentiate themselves by offering products that their competitors don’t offer.  
 
Yet, a competitive industry as a whole may generate a positive surplus for its customers.  In 
absence of its product, the customer may have to buy a less satisfactory substitute, possibly at a 
higher price.  Therefore, the sum of customer value generated by individual firms in an industry 
is less than or equal to the sum of customer value generated by the industry as a whole. Similar 






C. VALUE OF THE FIRM TO ITS VENDORS 
 
This value is defined analogously to the firm’s value to its customers, except that the vendors’ 
contributions take the form of goods and services, and they tend to receive cash from the firm.  If 
the market for the factor is competitive, an individual firm generates no value for a vendor who 
can always sell his resource at the same price elsewhere.  Following the argument from the 
preceding section, all buyers of the resource may yet, collectively, create value for the vendor.  
 
D. VALUE OF THE FIRM TO ITS EMPLOYEES 
 
Value to the employee can be evaluated in a similar manner.  In this reckoning, resources 
expected by an employee include:  wages, benefits, satisfaction, relationships, human skills, and 
reputation over the employment horizon.  Employee’s opportunity cost of skills and effort 
contributed to the firm is subtracted from the value of resources received to arrive at the value of 
the firm.  Again, unless the expectation of this value is non-negative (benefits are not exceeded 
by the opportunity cost), there is no reason for the employee to take the job.  In a perfectly 
competitive job market, an individual employer generates no surplus for the employee, making 
him indifferent among competing employers. 
 
E. VALUE OF THE FIRM TO THE GOVERNMENT 
 
Governments at various levels contribute resources to firms, mostly in the form of non-priced 
public services such as health, education, public safety, courts, laws, etc.  They also receive 
resources from the firms in the form of taxation on corporate income, payrolls, property, sales, 
vehicles, etc.  In addition, governments contribute resources to firms in the form of priced goods 
and services such as highway tolls, passports, and fishing licenses.  The value of a firm to the 
government can be reckoned as the sum of values from priced and non-priced services.  Since 
priced services are mostly private goods, value to the government of providing such services to a 
firm can be handled analogously to valuation by other vendors.  Valuation of non-priced 
services, being mostly public goods, is an important challenge we shall discuss in the section on 
externalities.  When a government receives a net contribution from a firm (taxes and fees exceed 
the opportunity cost of resources spent on providing services to the firm), the firm has a positive 
value to the government. 
 





F. VALUE OF THE FIRM TO THE COMMUNITY 
 
Community, like governments, can be considered at different levels—local, national or global.  
Most exchanges between firms and community take the form of positive and negative 
externalities.  Firms may attract visitors, name recognition, and related businesses to its 
neighborhood, as well as add pollution and congestion. They may also contribute directly to civic 
and charitable organizations.  Value of the firm to the community is the net result of all these 
resource flows.  It is often the subject of social accounting.  We will return to the difficult 
problems of estimating externalities in a later section.  
 
Value of the firm is the sum of its value to all its participants—the excess of total resources 
generated over the opportunity costs of all resource inputs.  Much has already been written about 
the shareholder value.  We shall focus our attention on the sum, its other components, and 
implications for accounting and management. 
 
IV. MEASUREMENT OF VALUE 
 
J. M. Clark (1936) points to three fundamental challenges to determining the value of private 
enterprise:  
One is that the problem of the collective efficiency of private enterprise involves quantities and 
qualities, of which actual market prices are not the only measure, and, I would add, some of which 
command no market price at all under present conditions, although with changes in law and custom, 
they might perhaps come to command one. Another is that measures of value which may be less exact 
than those of the market are also much more fundamental.  And a third is that our most fundamental 
concepts would be independent of institutions of competitive exchange; they should be such as would 
hold even in a socialistic economy (p. ?). 
 
Resources flow to and from the firm under a variety of conditions.  Some resources, of which 
capital is perhaps is the best example, have well organized liquid markets that approach 
perfection (see Sunder 1999a, 1999b, 2000).  Price is easy to observe and approximates 
opportunity cost well.  At the other extreme, markets do not exist for clean air and safe streets, 
raising difficult problems for value measurement.  Let us explore the links between market 







A. MARKETS AND VALUE OF THE FIRM 
 
If the markets for all factors of production and for all products were perfect, the value of the firm 
to all participants, and therefore its total value, would be zero.  The prices prevailing in the 
respective markets would be the opportunity costs for the agents.  In a perfect labor market, there 
is only one wage available for the skills an employee has to offer, and this wage is available to 
him from many different firms.  Thus a perfect market makes sure that the value of the 
employee’s wage is equal to the opportunity cost making the value of the firm to the employee 
zero.  Similarly, if the market for the product of a firm were perfect, one price for the product 
would prevail, driving the value of the firm to the customer to zero.  Similar arguments would 
apply to other agents, including the shareholders.  
 
Existence of value for any agent requires the presence of imperfection in the respective product 
or factor markets.  While perfection is the tendency of competitive markets under classical 
conditions, it is not the goal of any agent.  Agents seek value for themselves, and it can only be 
found in crevices of market imperfections.  As agents exploit any imperfections they may 
discover, they diminish or eliminate the imperfections in the process of seeking profits.  In 
search of profits, agents not only seek out but also create market imperfections.  
 
Even in otherwise perfect markets, agents specialize to create little local monopolies of their 
own, and seek to exploit them in bargaining with others.  A special skill, special knowledge, 
special product, special service, patent, are all ways to creating and exploiting such monopolies.  
Creation of each monopoly makes the market a little less perfect, opening a gap between the sale 
price and opportunity cost of the resource.  This gap is the value.  Agent’s exploitation of the 
value created through specialization begins to close the gap, and diminishes the value for the 
future.  To stay ahead, the agent must continually and dynamically seek other ways of 
distinguishing the resource he/she has to offer to create new values, exhausting it in the process 
of capturing it.  Creating value is more like a treadmill than a ski lift. 
 
Of course, markets are hardly perfect.  Even without conscious and explicit efforts to specialize 
and create value, various kinds of transaction costs create gaps in which value exists.  My 
existing job retains its value for me because it is costly for me to find another job that 
compensates me at the level my skills deserve.   I am paid my current compensation because it is 
costly for my employer to find a worker with even better skills to do the job.  The cost of a job 
search lowers the employee’s opportunity cost of keeping the present job; costs of search, 
recruitment, and training make it cheaper for my employer to retain my services.   
 
Values rise as markets become less perfect.  In more perfect markets, valuation is easier to do, 
but there is less to value.  In extreme cases, markets disappear altogether, providing no assistance 
in valuation.  





B. EXTERNALITIES IN VALUE OF THE FIRM 
 
Difficult problems of measurement arise when goods and services are not priced even in 
relatively imperfect markets.   With zero marginal cost and impossibility of excluding non-
payers from their benefits, pure public goods are inherently incapable of supporting a price.  
Most organizations produce and consume some public goods.  Building an auto assembly plant 
in a rural area improves skills, employment, retail stores, property values, roads, entertainment 
and public schools.  They are called externalities because there is no direct way for the firm to 
extract a price from individuals who benefit from these public goods.  The extensive concept 
value of the firm includes the value of these benefits bestowed on individuals or the community. 
 
Pollution and congestion are examples of negative externalities a firm may impose on others 
without compensating them.  This imposition is counted negatively in valuing the firm from the 
point of view of such uncompensated parties.  The National Accountants Association’s social 
performance measures included in Appendix A is a more complete listing of positive and 
negative externalities.   
 
C. DIFFICULTIES OF VALUING EXTERNALITIES 
 
Absent transaction prices and externalities need alternative methods for valuation.  As an 
example, consider vans provided by the firm to transport employees between nearby subway 
stations and the factory free of charge.  Cost of the service to the firm, say X, is easily measured, 
and treated as an expense in calculating net income to the shareholders.  If we stop here, the 
extensive income of the firm to all agents is understated because net income to shareholders 
ignores some of the benefits of the service to agents other than shareholders.   A part of benefits 
of the service flows back to the shareholders in the form of lowered costs of employee parking, 
absenteeism, fatigue, etc.  This benefit, say Y1, to the shareholders is included in net income 
through lowered labor costs and higher productivity.   
 
A second part of the benefit accrues to the employees in the form of avoided cost of alternative 
transportation, saving in commuting time, fatigue, etc.  These benefits, say Y2, must be added to 
other components of compensation in calculating their income stream from employment.  The 
saving in the cost of alternative transportation can be estimated reasonably well in terms of 
money if there is a market for such services.  Savings in time, fatigue, etc., vary across people, 
making it difficult for the firm to come up with reasonable estimates.  Benefits of less fatigue 
may be subjective, difficult to estimate quantitatively, and even more difficult to state in terms of 
money.  In any case, there is little chance that the firm can come up with a better estimate of Y2 






A third part of the benefit of the transportation service accrues to fellow commuters by train 
(lowering the cost of mass transportation through higher utilization), commuters by road (less 
rush hour traffic), transport companies (additional customers), local government (less spending 
on roads and parking), and fellow citizens (less pollution).  One could take this argument further 
and identify progressively diffuse second and third order consequences of the transportation 
service.   
 
Perhaps it is best to group these agents together into “community” and estimate the value of the 
firm to this group by identifying various positive and negative externalities in a lump sum.  Tools 
of social cost-benefit analysis are widely employed for this purpose, though rarely in social 
accounting reports produced by corporations.  Being based on  judgments and assumptions, 
estimates can be quite sensitive to the interests of the party who prepares them.  Cost-benefit 
analyses produced to support or oppose public expenditures on stadiums for sports teams are a 
good example of this problem.   
 
What is the appropriate discount rate for valuing the net cost-benefit stream to the community?  
Social rate of discount, lower than private discount rates, is used for this purpose.  Voluminous 
literature already exists on the topic (see Caplin and Leahy 2000). 
 
V. MERGERS, ACQUISITIONS AND CORPORATE VALUE  
 
Consider the debates surrounding the consequences of corporate mergers and acquisitions.  
There have been numerous studies (see Ruback 1983; also literature reviews by Jensen and 
Ruback 1983, and Jarrell, Brickley and Netter 1988) of the effect of mergers and acquisitions on 
shareholder value.  On balance, findings of stock market event studies, predicated on the 
assumption of market efficiency, favor a transfer of wealth from the acquiring firm shareholders 
to the shareholders of the acquired firms; and a small gain, at most, in shareholder value overall.  
Scherer (1988) on the other hand concludes that, while some mergers may increase shareholder 
value and others decrease it, on the whole the effect of mergers on shareholder value is about 
even.   
 
A interesting feature of these debates, especially those oriented to public policy, is that they are 
focused on the consequences of mergers and acquisitions for shareholder value; only 
occasionally including the value to the holders of debt securities and taxes to the government 
(see Dhaliwal and Sunder 1988).  Effects of these mergers on labor are rarely examined (see 
Brown and Medoff 1987 and Shleifer and Summers 1987 for two exceptions) and effects on 
other classes of agents are ignored.  
 
One way of making sense of this state of affairs is that the debaters assume the standard 
neoclassical firm perspective in which all factors of production except the equity capital earn 
their opportunity costs from the firm, and get no share in the surplus generated by the firm.  The 
economic profit accruing to the suppliers of all these other factors of production being zero, the 





value of the firm for them is also zero; both before as well as after the merger or acquisition.  
Under this perspective, changes in the value of the firm are confined to the shareholder value; 
therefore it makes sense to carry on the debate on consequences of mergers on the basis of 
empirical evidence on shareholder value alone. 
 
But this explanation runs into a difficulty.   As we discussed in earlier sections of the paper, 
agents who transact with the firm through relatively perfect markets for factors or products 
should expect to get close to their opportunity cost—the price that is well-defined in these 
markets—and nothing more or less.  In the U.S. markets for equity capital are frequently cited to 
be efficient, at least more efficient than others.  If a firm generates a surplus (value of output in 
excess of the sum of opportunity costs of factors of production), holders of equity capital are 
least likely to capture any significant piece of the pie.  Most of the surplus should end up with the 
agents who transact in less perfect markets. 
 
Shareholders have the only open-ended contract in the firm; all others are negotiated 
periodically.  Labor, customers and vendors have frequent opportunities to renegotiate the terms 
of their transactions with the firm, and try to capture a share of the surplus whenever possible.  
Given the short-term nature of their contracts, they have an option value that the shareholders, 
tied into long-term contract as a group, lack.  Agents with short-term contracts can quit when 
confronted with having to absorb a negative surplus.  Employees with unvested pension benefits 
and shareholders do not have this option. 
 
This analysis suggests that an assessment of the consequences of mergers and acquisitions 
require an analysis of not only the shareholder values, but also of values accruing to other 
participating agents as outlined above.  Being tied into an indefinite term contract and 
imperfections of corporate governance, shareholders may not be able to capture all or even most 
of the ex post benefits of value-enhancing mergers and acquisitions; these benefits leak out to 
corporate managers through holes in corporate governance, and to other agents through periodic 
negotiations under uncertainty and market imperfections.  Yet, the shareholders are left holding 
the bag when a merger turns out to be value depleting.  Corporate executives, labor, customers, 
vendors and the community may capture significant shares in value enhancements from mergers, 
and bear only a smaller fraction of value depletions.  Perhaps we cannot know for sure without 






VI. APPENDIX A 
 
Excerpted from the Report of National Association of Accountants Committee on Accounting 
for Corporate Social Performance 
 
IV. Major Areas of Social Performance 
Community Involvement 
General philanthropy—Corporate support of educational institutions, cultural 
activities, recreational programs, health and community welfare agencies and 
similar eleemosynary organizations 
Public and private transportation—Alleviating or preventing urban transportation 
problems, including the provision of mass transportation of employees 
Health services—Providing health care facilities and services and the support of 
programs to reduce disease and illness 
Housing—Improving the standard of dwellings, the construction of needed 
dwellings and the financing of housing renovation and construction 
Aid in personal and business problems—Alleviation of problems related to the 
physically handicapped, child-care, minority businesses, disadvantaged 
persons, etc. 
Community planning and improvement—Programs of urban planning and 
renewal, crime prevention, etc. 
Volunteer activities—Encouraging and providing time for employees to be active 
as volunteers in community activities 
Specialized food programs—The provision of meals to meet the dietary needs of 
the aged, the infirm, the disadvantaged children, and other groups 
Education—The development and implementation of educational programs to 
supplement those of the public and private schools such as work study 
programs; and employee service on school boards, school authorities and 
college university trustee and advisory boards 
Human Resources 
Employment practices—Providing equal job opportunities for all persons, 
creation of summer job opportunities for students, and recruiting in depressed 
areas 
Training programs—Providing programs for all employees to increase their skills, 
earning potential and job satisfaction 
Promotion policies—Recognizing the abilities of all employees and providing 
equal opportunities for promotion 
Employment continuity—Scheduling production so as to minimize lay-offs and 
recalls, maintaining facilities in efficient operating condition so that they 
would not have to be abandoned because of deterioration and exploring all 
feasible alternatives to closing a facility 





Remuneration—Maintaining a level of total salaries and wages plus benefits 
which is in line with others, in either the industry or community 
Working conditions—Providing a safe, healthful and pleasant working 
environment 
Drugs and alcohol—Providing education and counseling for employees to prevent 
or alleviate problems in these and similar areas 
Job enrichment—Providing the most meaningful work experiences practical for 
all employees 
Communications—Establishing and maintaining two-way communication 
between all levels of employees to secure suggestions, to provide information 
as to what the company is actually doing and how each department’s activities 
relate to the total corporate activity, and to inform employees’ families and 
friends of corporate activities 
Physical Resources and Environmental Contributions 
Air—Timely meeting of the law and going beyond the law in avoiding the 
creation of, alleviating, or eliminating pollutants in these areas 
Water—Timely meeting of the law and going beyond the law in avoiding the 
creation of, alleviating, or eliminating pollutants in these areas 
Sound—Timely meeting of the law and going beyond the law in avoiding the 
creation of, alleviating, or eliminating pollutants in these areas 
Solid waste—Disposal of solid waste in such a manner as to minimize 
contamination, reduce its bulk, etc., and the design of processes and products 
which will minimize the creation of solid waste 
Use of scarce resources—The conservation of existing energy sources, the 
development of new energy sources, and the conservation of scarce materials 
Aesthetics—The design and location of facilities in conformance with 
surroundings and with pleasing architecture and landscaping 
Product or Service Contributions 
Completeness and clarity of labeling, packaging, and marketing representation—
Assurance that labeling and representation as to methods of use, limitations on 
use, hazards of use, shelf-life, quantity of contents, and quality cannot be 
misunderstood 
Warranty provisions—Adherence to all stated and implied warranties of a product 
with implementation through timely recalls, repairs or replacements 
Responsiveness to consumer complaints—prompt and complete responses to all 
complaints received 
Consumer education—Literature and media programs to keep consumers 
informed of product and service characteristics, methods and areas of use of 
products, and of planned product changes and discontinuances 
Product quality—Assurance through adequate control—“quality assurance”—that 
quality is at least equal to what customers may reasonably expect on the basis 






Product safety—Design or formulation and packaging of products to minimize 
possibilities of harm or injury in product use 
Content and frequency of advertising—Giving full consideration to the omission 
of any media material which may be adverse or offensive; and the avoidance 
of repetition to the extent that it becomes repugnant 
Constructive research—Orienting technical and marketing research to meet 
defined social needs and to avoid creating social and environmental problems 
or to minimize such problems: e.g., energy consumption 
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